Reforma de consolidación de la paz y la policía en la nueva Europa: lecciones de Kosovo
| Autor | Thomas Feltes |
| Cargo del Autor | Universidad de Bochum |
| Páginas | 136-157 |
136
REFORMA DE CONSOLIDACIÓN DE LA PAZ
Y LA POLICÍA EN LA NUEVA EUROPA:
LECCIONES DE KOSOVO
Thomas Feltes
Universidad de Bochum
thomas.feltes@rub.de
Alemania
RESUMEN
La reforma de la policía en países en transición está íntimamente
relacionada con el mantenimiento de la paz y la consolidación
de la paz. El artículo analiza los éxitos y fracasos y el papel de
la policía, usando a Kosovo como un ejemplo. Es esencial saber
si estrategias, estructuras y métodos de los militares y las
intervenciones de la policía están trabajando, y necesitamos
saber si la reforma de la administración, la policía y el poder
judicial a raíz de una intervención internacional es sostenible.
Como la paz y la justicia van de la mano, se discute el papel de
la reforma de la policía en el contexto de la reforma del poder
judicial. Hay un enfrentamiento abierto entre la comprensión
internacional dominante de lo que una “sociedad justa” o una
sociedad bajo el “estado de Derecho” es o debería ser por un
lado y el conocimiento local de los miembros de una sociedad,
que sobrevivió a diferentes tipos de represión y la guerra
durante años o siglos, a menudo mediante la construcción de
sus propias estructuras informales y sus propias normas de
convivencia.
PALABRAS CLAVE:
aprendizaje, estudio de caso, paz.
INTRODUCTION
In November 2007, three months before Kosovo declared
independence, the European Commission Progress Report
on Kosovo concluded that in Kosovo “very little progress has
been achieved” and that a multi-ethnic country seems to be
a far removed possibility (European Commission 2007).
The report stated that the “focus on standards before status”
independence of Kosovo has signiicantly delayed reform
efforts.
Some former progress has been followed by the lack of
capacity to carry out and implement laws. Civil servants are
– so the EU report - still vulnerable to political interference,
corrupt practices, and nepotism: “corruption is still prevalent,
undermining a proper functioning of the institutions in
Kosovo”. The conclusion of the report is that “overall, Kosovo’s
public administration remains weak and ineficient Some
progress has been made in reforming public administration,
but these reforms are “at an early stage”. The same observation
can be applied to the judicial system, which is still fragile, and
the execution of judgement remains insuficient There is also a
discrepancy between the wishes and aspirations of the people
of Kosovo, and the ambitions of the government and leaders
of the political parties. The focus on status had the effect of
REFORMA DE CONSOLIDACIÓN DE LA PAZ Y LA POLICÍA EN LA NUEVA EUROPA: LECCIONES DE KOSOVO
137
undermining all the important economic and
social issues.
Considering that human rights were not
respected under the supervision of UNMIK
and KFOR (examples are the violent
demonstrations in March 2004 and February
2007), how can we expect that the situation
will change after Kosovo has declared
independence? And what is or might be in fact
the “supervised independence”, mentioned by
EU and UN, who (in summer 2008) are still
negotiating how the future assistance for the
country should be organized?
Police Reform in countries in transition
is closely connected to what is called
“peacekeeping” or “peacebuildung”. William
Smith (2007) has shown, using Jürgen
Habermass relections on Kosovo and
Iraq, that the past decade has witnessed
the emergence of numerous cosmopolitan
theories of humanitarian military
intervention. These theories anticipate a more
cosmopolitan future, where interventions
will be authorized by new cosmopolitan
institutions and carried out by reformed
cosmopolitan military and police. But as
long as we do not have such cosmopolitan
regimes’, capable of carrying out militarized
police actions Habermas we need to
know whether the already existing strategies,
structures, and methods of military and police
activities in the aftermath of an international
intervention are working. As long as we do not
have functioning supranational institutions,
capable of enforcing human rights, or multi-
layered institutions and networks of global
governance, we need to realize that we are on
a “transitional stage between international
and cosmopolitan law” (Habermas 1998).
And as long as we have to trust in military
interventions and military force to advance
humanitarian goals, we need to discuss the
role of police forces in this context.
To decide whether an intervention is or might
be justiied by whatever de iure or de facto
reason it is necessary to ind out whether
• The military intervention was successful
in terms of ending what was the reason
for the intervention (e.g. ethnic cleansing,
genocide, crimes against or violation of
humanities etc.).
• The after-care of the military intervention,
the establishment of rule of law, of
a functioning police, judiciary, and
administration, was organized in such a
way, that a possible success by the former
intervention will be secured, stabilized
and sustainable in a longer run.
To answer these questions, an evaluation
of both the intervention and the after-care
is necessary. But what are the criteria for
such an evaluation? When do we judge an
intervention as “successful”, when the after-
care?
IS “ENLIGHTENMENT” THE
DIFFERENCE?
Before trying to explain what happened in
Kosovo and what are the reasons why “the
world failed in Kosovo” (King and Mason
2006), it is necessary to comment on what
might make it so dificult to understand what
was and is still happening on the Balkans.
Some people say that the difference between
Serbia and Western States is the denial of
the “enlightenment”. Serbian politicians –
that´s how they argue - aim at the collective
rights of their nation, whilst the western
understanding focuses at the individual
rights of people (Rathfelder 2008). This is
the supposed reason, why human rights as
individual rights are not accepted, and why for
Serbs the centre of consideration is the nation
or the peoples (`narod´ in Serb language).
Consequently, they reject the idea of rule
of law in a western understanding, as they
reject the idea of individualisation of guilt,
e.g. in context of war crimes. War criminals
like Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic (who
was inally arrested in July are in the
eyes of Serbs not guilty because they are part
of the nation (“Volkskörper”) and have acted
in the people’s interest. Because of that, they
are protected and admired as heroes and not
condemned as war criminals (Ivanji 2008).
Other nations deined as enemies may be
punished to protect one´s own nation. Jürgen
Habermas commented on the war in Kosovo
as follows: The war:
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