Intellectual Property Rights as Constituent Elements of a Competition-based MarketEconomy

AutorJosef Drexl
CargoDirector del Instituto Max Planck en el áreade Propiedad Intelectual y Derecho a la Competencia en Munich. Profesor Honorario de la Universidad de Munich, Alemania
Anuario Andino de Derechos Intelectuales.
Año IV - N.º 5. Lima, 2009
Intellectual Property Rights as
Constituent Elements of a Competition-based
Market Economy
Sumario: I. Introduction. II. Paradigms on the Relationship of IPRs and Competition. 2.1 IPRs as an Exemption
from Competition. 2.2 The (Neo)Schumpeterian Eff‌i ciency/Consumer Welfare Approach. 2.3.
Theory of ‘Complementarily’. III. The ‘IP fallacy’ of Disregarding the Market. IV. Conceptualizing
the IP System in a IMarket-Oriented’ Approach. V. The Market-Oriented Approach and the Design
of IP Laws. VI. Conclusion.
ATRIP has chosen a tide for its annual conferences of 2006 and 2007 which is still somewhat
unusual for IP lawyers. ‘Intellectual Property and Market Power’ seems to be a topic that so far
belonged to the exclusive patrimonies professional of competition lawyers. A competition law
conference organized under the same tide would of course have focused on the application of
competition laws to IP-related cases. Far from infringing on what is owned by colleagues, ATRIP
promises to go well beyond competition law in the narrow sense by critically investigating the con-
sequences of IPRs on competition at large in view of developing and reforming IP law itself.
Whereas many of the speakers will deal with more concrete problems of modern IP systems,
chis keynote address will highlight some fundamental ideas of the relationship between inte-
llectual property and market power in a rather unorthodox way. The perspective will literally be
turned around by conceptualizing an ideal IP-system in a market-oriented approach. The question
to be asked is what kind of IP system does a competition-based market economy need.
At least sometimes and under certain conditions, IPRs cause considerable market power1.
* Este artículo se publicó en Ghidini/Genovesi (Eds.): Intellectual Property and Market Power, ATRIP Papers
2006-2007, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 2008. Se reproduce con expresa autorización del autor.
1 See, for instance, Josef Drexl, ‘The relationship between legal exclusivity and economic market power:
Links and limits’, in: Inge Govaere and Hanns Ullrich (eds), Public Policy and Trade in Intellectual Property
Law, Frankfurt am Main (Lang Verlag) (forthcoming), section I; Harry First, ‘Controlling the Intellectual
Property Grab: Protecting Innovation, not Innovators’, 38 Rutgers 1.J. 365,389 (2007) (‘Interpretation of
restrictions involving the statutory ‘rams of patent and copyright need to consider the reason for these
grants in the f‌i rst place, that is to incentivize Innovation, and to acknowledge that these grants create some
degree of marker power and some ability to seek and obtain monopoly rents.’ (Emphasis added).

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